Robert Joseph
FameRank: 6

"Robert G. Joseph" is a senior scholar at the National Institute for Public Policy and professor at Missouri State University. He was the United States Special Envoy for Nuclear proliferation/Nuclear Nonproliferation, with ambassadorial rank. Prior to this post, Dr. Joseph was the Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, a position he held until January 24, 2007.

Ambassador Joseph is well known for being instrumental in creating the Proliferation Security Initiative and as the architect of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. He was also the US chief negotiator to Libya in 2003 who convinced the Libyans to give up their WMD programs. He also recently authored a book describing his experience in negotiating with Libya entitled "Countering WMD."

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A nuclear-armed Iran would represent a direct threat to U.S. forces and allies in the region, the greater Middle East, Europe and Asia, and eventually to the United States itself. At a minimum, it could seek to use nuclear weapons as a powerful tool of intimidation and blackmail.

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We would urge both Congress and our international partners to avoid the temptation to renegotiate the deal.

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That together lead to the conclusion Iran is pursuing a nuclear weapons capability.

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It's a very family oriented program. Coach Brown is down to earth and humble. I'm real excited for the opportunity to play there.

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In terms of the status of the civil nuclear co-operation agreement with India, I think both governments continue to believe that this is a very important arrangement for the future. We have made some progress, but we have more progress that needs to be made.

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Pakistan does not have the same energy requirements, of course, that India does.

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These measures are necessary for our defense and the defense of our friends and allies.

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We are taking a number of new steps - defensive measures - that are intended to provide protection against all aspects of the North Korean proliferation threat.

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We've always said that going to the Security Council is not an end in itself and did not signal an end to negotiations. Going to the council provides a menu of options that can be used to try to get Iran to reverse course.

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