"Stephen D. Biddle" is an American author, historian, policy analyst and columnist whose work concentrates on Foreign policy of the United States/U.S. foreign policy. Currently, he is a Professor of Political Science and the Director of the Institute for Security and Conflict Studies at the George Washington University. He is perhaps best known for his award-winning 2004 book Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle, published through Princeton University Press. He also has worked in groups under Generals Stanley McChrystal and David Petraeus forming U.S. counter-insurgency policy.

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Turning over the responsibility for fighting the insurgents to local forces . . . threatens to exacerbate the communal tensions that underlie the conflict and undermine the power-sharing negotiations needed to end it.

They say we have to be perfect at everything at the same time. We can't afford to be perfect at everything.... There's a fixed size of the pie.

I think it is probably a good general description of American foreign policy that we don't have as much control as we think we do.

Right now the policy in Iraq is to stay until and unless the national military is capable of waging war on its own.

Removing the United States from the scene means eliminating the player most loyal to the idea of a stable, heterogeneous Iraq.

Although it is being fought at low intensity for now, it could easily escalate if Americans and Iraqis make the wrong choices.

It represents a misreading of the nature of the problem. When we make these forces stronger, we make the underlying problem worse, not better. We're throwing gas on the political fire.

Unfortunately the nature of this conflict is that we're going to have to stay there longer than we would like.

Given that strengthening a military they view as their enemy strengthens their resistance creates political problems -- the first thing we need to do is slow down, rather than speed up.