What's happened is that an incessant, an insidious insurgency has repeatedly attacked the key infrastructure targets, reducing outputs.

If the U.S. and the world do not buy the necessary time for Iraq to be able to shoulder their own infrastructure, it will risk undermining, or even reversing, the value of the investments we have made.

That number in fact will be much higher.

One day's delay is another day's lack of progress.

I've been consumed for a year with the fear we would run out of money to finish projects.

The need for more funding has reached a critical point.

The CPA did not implement adequate financial controls.

A key lesson of the [inspector general's] experience is that oversight works best when it is up-front, highly visible and forward looking.

Though the causes may be numerous and valid, the existence of the gap simply means that the completion of the U.S.-funded portion of Iraq's reconstruction will leave many planned projects on the drawing board.